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Sanchez: The Section 115 Mechanical License and the Copyright Modernizatio

THE SECTION 115 MECHANICAL LICENSE AND
THE COPYRIGHT MODERNIZATION ACT: THE
HARDSHIPS OF LEGISLATING MUSIC
INDUSTRY NEGOTIATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
John Philip Sousa, the famous American composer, created
great works such as "El Capitan" and "The Stars and Stripes
Forever," the national march of the United States, in 1896.'
Around the same time, inventions known as the player piano and
the piano roll were gaining wide popularity in America.2 These
inventions allowed third parties to mechanically reproduce a
melody for which the perforated piano roll was cut The piano
roll inventors would produce thousands of rolls based on
copyrighted musical works, and sell them without paying a penny
to the copyright owners.4 Thus, a composer like Sousa would not
be paid whenever someone copied his works onto a piano roll.
This raised the question of whether a copyright owner's rights in a
musical work should go so far as to control mechanical copies of
works made on piano rolls.' Sousa was of the opinion that the
His
37, 71 (1973).
2. See White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 9 (1908)
("The manufacture of such instruments and the use of such musical rolls has
developed rapidly in recent years in this country and abroad.").
1. PAUL E. BIERLEY, JOHN PHILIP SOUSA: A DESCRIPTIVE CATALOG OF

WORKS

3. Id. at 9-10.
4. Arguments on the Bills S.6330 and H.R. 19853, to Amend and Consolidate
the Acts Respecting Copyright: Hearing Before the Comm. on Patents, 59th
Cong. 24 (1906) [hereinafter 1906 Argument] (statement of John Philip Sousa,

Composer).
5. Section 115 of the Copyright Act: In Need of an Update?: HearingBefore
the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 16 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 Hearing]

(statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office).
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copyright owner's rights should extend so far.6 However,
unfortunately for music composers, in 1908, the United States
Supreme Court held in White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v.
Apollo Co. that the perforated piano rolls were not "copies within
the meaning of the copyright act."7 While this signaled a victory
for the producers of player pianos and piano rolls, their glory was
short-lived. One year later, after heated debates, Congress enacted
the Copyright Act of 1909, which gave copyright owners of
musical works control over mechanical piano roll reproductions
While this gave music composers the protection they desired,
Congress was worried that an exclusive right to make mechanical
reproductions of musical works might result in a monopoly.9 This
concern arose because a manufacturer of player piano rolls, the
Aeolian Company, had been acquiring exclusive contract rights
from composers and publishers.1" In order to avoid such exclusive
contracts, the 1909 Act made it compulsory on the part of
copyright owners to provide licenses for mechanical
reproductions, stating:
That whenever the owner of a musical copyright
has used or permitted or knowingly acquiesced in
the use of the copyrighted work . . . any other

person may make similar use of the copyrighted
work upon the payment to the copyright proprietor
of a royalty of 2 cents on each such part
manufactured ... .11

6. 1906 Argument, supra note 4, at 24 (statement of John Philip Sousa,

Composer).
7. White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 18.
8. 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1909) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006))
("[Composition owner has the right] to make any arrangement or setting of it or
of the melody of it in any system of notation or any form of record in which the
thought of an author may be recorded and from which it may be read or
reproduced.").
9. 2004 Hearing,supra note 5, at 17 (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register
of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office).
10. Recording Indus. Assoc. of Am. v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 662 F.2d
1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
11. 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1909) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006)).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss1/3
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Thus, a third party could only obtain a compulsory license for a
mechanical reproduction of a copyright owner's musical work if
the copyright owner authorized the first mechanical reproduction.
It is important to note that a royalty was payable to the copyright
owner for each mechanical reproduction by a licensee, regardless
of whether those reproductions were distributed. 2 Furthermore,
anyone seeking a compulsory license first had to file a notice of
intent to use with the copyright owner, and a duplicate notice with
the copyright office. 3 There was also a notice requirement for the
copyright owner. Section l(e) created a duty upon the copyright
owner to notify the copyright office if he made a mechanical
reproduction of his musical work. Failure to do so resulted in a
"complete defense to any suit, action, or proceeding for any
infringement of such copyright."' 4 Moreover, while the legislation
was meant to address piano rolls, the mechanical license also
applied to phonograph records. 5 Finally, these rights granted to
copyright owners via the mechanical license were not retroactive;
this meant Section 1 (e) only applied to works copyrighted after the
1909 Act went into effect. 6 Thus, John Philip Sousa was not
entitled to royalties for mechanical reproductions of some of his
greatest works, something to which he staunchly objected."'
Part I of this article describes the details of Section 115 of the
Copyright Act of 1976, and gives a comparison to its predecessor
legislation found in the Copyright Act of 1909. It also includes a
discussion of the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings

12.

2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVD NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §

8.04[H][1] n.145 (2006) [hereinafter NIMMER].
13. 17 U.S.C. § 101(e) (1909) (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 412, 501-04
(2006)).
14. 17 U.S.C. § l(e) (1909) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006)).
15. 2004 Hearing, supra note 5, at 16 (statement of Marybeth Peters,
Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office).
16. 17 U.S.C. § l(e) (1909) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006))
("Provided, [t]hat the provisions of this Act, so far as they secure copyright
controlling the parts of instruments serving to reproduce mechanically the
musical work, shall include only compositions published and copyrighted after
this Act goes into effect . . ").
17. See 1906 Argument, supra note 4, at 24 (statement of John Philip Sousa,
Composer) (stating his extremely negative and slightly obscene feelings on the

new law not applying to existing copyrights).
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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Act of 1995, specifically the creation of the digital phonorecord
delivery ("DPD") and what that meant for the Section 115
mechanical license. Following the discussion of DPDs is a
detailed look at the parties interested in Section 115 reform and the
competing interests between the various groups. Part II outlines
the Section 115 Reform Act as included in the Copyright
Modernization Act. Part III analyzes the Section 115 Reform Act,
how it would affect the parties interested in reform, and why
certain provisions ultimately led to the legislation's demise. Part
IV discusses elimination of Section 115, as proposed by the
Copyright Office, and why the parties did not agree to this
solution.
II. BACKGROUND

A. The Copyright Act of 1976, Section 115
In the legislative history addressing the compulsory
mechanical 8 license in Section 115 of the Copyright Act of 1976,
the argument shifted away from whether a compulsory licensing
scheme should exist to how to relieve copyright owners of
unnecessary burdens and what the specific royalty rate for the
compulsory license should be.19 Some of the key changes from the
1909 Act are as follows.
First, a Section 115 compulsory license is not triggered until,
under the authority of the copyright owner, phonorecords" of the
nondramatic musical work2' are distributed to the public.2 This is
18. The terms "compulsory licence" and "mechanical license" are
interchangeable and will be used as such when referring to the Section 115
license.
19. 2004 Hearing, supra note 5, at 18 (statement of Marybeth Peters,
Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office).; see also H.R. REP. No. 83, at
66-67 (1967).
20. "'Phonorecords' are material objects in which sounds, other than those
accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by any
method now known or later developed ....
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
21. "Nondramatic musical work" is a term of art found frequently in the
Copyright Act, though the Act does not define it. The term refers to both the
musical composition and lyrics (if any) of a song. "Nondramatic musical work"

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss1/3
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a departure from the 1909 Act, which triggered the compulsory
license when the copyright owner "used or permitted or knowingly
acquiesced in the use of the copyrighted work" for mechanical
reproduction.2 3
Second, the mechanical license is only available to licensees
whose "primary purpose in making phonorecords is to distribute
them to the public for private use. ' 24 Therefore, phonorecords
intended primarily for commercial use, including broadcasters and
jukebox operators, will not be granted compulsory licenses.25
Third, while the compulsory license permits the licensee to
create his own sound recording of the musical work by using his
own musicians and recording engineers, it does not permit the
licensee to copy the sound recording of a musical work that was
created by someone else.2 6 This makes clear the distinction that a
phonorecord can invoke two rights: (1) the right in the musical
work; and (2) the right in the sound recording of that musical
work.
Fourth, whereas under the 1909 Act, a failure by the copyright
owner to file a notice of use "constituted a complete defense to any
suit, action or proceeding for any infringement of such
copyright, ' 27 under the 1976 Act, it only deprives the copyright
owner of the ability "to receive royalties under a compulsory
license. 28 On the other hand, under the current Act, failure of the
licensee to provide notice of intention to obtain a compulsory
license to the copyright owner29 "forecloses the possibility of a
and "musical work" are used interchangeably throughout this article.
22. 2 NIMMER, supra note 12, § 8.04[C] (citing 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)
(2006)).
23. 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1909) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006)).
24. 2 NIMMER, supra note 12, § 8.04[D] (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(l)
(2006)).

25. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 1476, at 108 (1976)).
26. Id. § 8.04[E]; see also 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1) (2006) (requiring
compulsory licensees to ensure the work is fixed lawfully and the sound
recording is authorized by the copyright owner).
27. 2 NIMMER, supra note 12, § 8.04[H][1] (quoting 17 U.S.C. § l(e) (1909)
(current version at 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006))).
28. Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(1) (2006)).
29. 17 U.S.C. § 115(b)(1) (2006) ("Any person who wishes to obtain a
compulsory license... [must] serve notice of intention to do so on the copyright
owner.").
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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compulsory license ....
Fifth, while the 1909 Act provided that a royalty of two cents
had to be paid by the licensee to the copyright owner for "each
such part manufactured, '31 under the current Act, a royalty
determined by the Copyright Royalty Judges is payable only for
phonorecords made and distributed by the licensee, once the
copyright owner is "identified in the registration or other public
records of the Copyright Office. ' 32 As Congress pointed out,
"made" was intended "to include within its scope every possible
manufacturing or other process capable of reproducing a sound
recording in phonorecords. ' '33 The term "distribution" means "any
act by which the person exercising the compulsory license
voluntarily relinquishes possession of a phonorecord ...regardless

of whether the distribution is to the public, passes title, constitutes
a gift, or is sold, rented, leased, or loaned. . .. ""
B. The 1990s and the DigitalPhonorecordDelivery
By the mid 1990s, the technology by which musical works were
embodied in sound recordings was in flux. 35 Gone were the days
of vinyl records and cassette tapes, as digital recordings embodied
in compact discs (CDs) became the preferred medium.36 Beyond
CDs, however, Congress contemplated that "new digital
transmission technologies may permit consumers to enjoy
performances of a broader range of higher-quality recordings than
has ever before been possible."37 In response to the inadequacy of

the then-existing copyright law to address new technologies
regarding digital transmission of sound recordings and musical
works, Congress created the Digital Performance Right in Sound

30. 2 NIMMER, supra note 12, § 8.04[G][1][a] (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 115(b)(2)
(2006)).
31. 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1909) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006)).
32. 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(1) (2006).
33. 2 NIMMER, supra note 12, § 8.04[H][1] (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 1476, at
110 (1976)).
34. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1476, at 110 (1976)).

35. Id. § 8.23[A][1].
36. S. REP. No. 104-128, at 13-14 (1995).
37. Id. at 14.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss1/3
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Recordings Act of 1995 ("DPRA").3 8 More
Specifically,
the
DPRA was created in part to "extend[ ] the mechanical
compulsory license to digital phonorecord deliveries [hereinafter
"DPDs"] . . .to maintain and reaffirm the mechanical rights of
songwriters and music publishers. . . ."" Section 115(d) defined a
"digital phonorecord delivery" as:
[E]ach individual delivery of a phonorecord by
digital transmission of a sound recording which
results in a specifically identifiable reproduction by
or for any transmission recipient of a phonorecord
of that sound recording, regardless of whether the
digital transmission is also a public performance of
the sound recording or any nondramatic musical
work embodied therein. A digital phonorecord
delivery does not result from a real-time, noninteractive subscription transmission of a sound
recording where no reproduction of the sound
recording or the musical work embodied therein is
made from the inception of the transmission
through to its receipt by the transmission recipient
in order to make the sound recording audible.4"
Thus, whenever a phonorecord is transmitted digitally to a
consumer, the copyright owner of the musical work is entitled to a
royalty payment under Section 115.' Nevertheless, as the DPD
definition recognizes, non-interactive subscription transmissions
do not constitute a DPD. It is clear from the Senate Report that
Congress was anticipating new technology such as webcasting or
satellite radio.42
Furthermore, the report indicates that if
38. Id.
39. 2 NIMMER, supra note 12, § 8.23[A][1] (quoting S. REP. No. 104-128, at
37 (1995)).

40. 17 U.S.C. § 115(d) (2006).
41. 2004 Hearing, supra note 5, at 21 (statement of Marybeth Peters,
Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office); see also § 115(c)(3)(A).
42. See S. REP. No. 104-128, at 45 (1995) ("For example, a transmission by a
noninteractive subscription transmission service that transmits in real time a
continuous program of music selections chosen by the transmitting entity, for
which a consumer pays a flat monthly fee, would not be a "digital phonorecord
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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subscribers of such a service record the programming of the
service through their own actions, this also would not constitute a
DPD.43
Another important aspect of the DPRA is found in Section
11 5(c)(3)(G)(i). 4 This section expands the statutory license for
DPDs of a musical work embodied in a sound recording, allowing
a licensee to digitally transmit the sound recordings of others, so
long as the license in the sound recording is obtained.45
Furthermore, the copyright owner of the sound recording may now
license not only his own rights in the sound recording, but also the
rights of the musical work embodied in the sound recording.46
The DPRA also changed the royalty payment scheme,
specifically addressing digital phonorecords as well as controlled
composition clauses. 47 Beginning in 1998, the royalty rates for

delivery....").
43. Id.
44.
"A digital

phonorecord delivery of a sound
recording is actionable as an act of infringement
under section 501, and is fully subject to the
remedies provided by sections 502 through 506 and
section 509, unless(I) the digital phonorecord delivery has been

authorized by the copyright owner of the
sound recording; and
(11) the owner of the copyright in the sound
recording or the entity making the digital
phonorecord delivery has obtained a
compulsory license under this section or has
otherwise been authorized by the copyright
owner of the musical work to distribute or
authorize the distribution, by means of a
digital phonorecord delivery, of each
musical work embodied in the sound
recording." § 115(c)(3)(G)(i).
45. 2004 Hearing, supra note 5, at 22 (statement of Marybeth Peters,
Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office).
46. Id.; see also § 115(c)(3)(I); S. REP. No. 104-128, at 43 (1995) ("The
changes to section 115 ...are intended to allow record companies to license not
only their rights, but also, if they choose to do so, the rights of writers and music
publishers to authorize digital phonorecord deliveries.").
47. A controlled composition clause is a common agreement found in
recording contracts whereby the singer/songwriter agrees to receive less than the
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss1/3
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DPD license agreements could be voluntarily negotiated or, if the
parties failed to reach an agreement, they could submit to
arbitration governed by the Copyright Royalty Judges. 8 The
Copyright Royalty Judges would then be required to establish rates
and terms that "distinguish between digital phonorecord deliveries
where the reproduction or distribution of the phonorecord is
incidental to the transmission which constitutes the digital
phonorecord delivery, and digital phonorecord deliveries in
general."4 9 Regarding controlled composition clauses, the DPRA
provides that for DPDs, the rate mandated by the DPRA will be
given effect in lieu of any negotiated controlled composition
clauses."
Nevertheless, there is an important exception.
Controlled composition clauses will be given effect if the artist
author enters into the contract "after the sound recording has been
fixed in a tangible medium of expression in a form intended for
commercial release." 51
C. The PartiesInterested in Reform of Section 115

1. The DigitalMedia Association
The Digital Media Association (DiMA) is a national trade
organization devoted to innovative digital media opportunities, but
more specifically, to protecting the rights of the online audio and
video industries. 2 Among some of its members are online media

mechanical statutory rate from the record company that makes and distributes
phonorecords containing the singer/songwriter's work. 2 NIMMER, supra note
12, § 8.23[E].
48. Id. § 8.23[D][1]. From 1993-2004, the Copyright Arbitration Royalty
Panel (CARP) governed arbitration. However, the Copyright Royalty and

Distribution Reform Act of 2004 abandoned the CARP and implemented
Copyright Royalty Judges to handle arbitration. See id § 7.27.
49. 2004 Hearing, supra note 5, at 24 (statement of Marybeth Peters,
Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office) (quoting § 1 15(c)(3)(D)).
50. 2 NIMMER, supra note 12, § 8.23[E] (citing § 115(c)(3)(E)(i)).

51. 2004 Hearing, supra note 5, at 23 (statement of Marybeth Peters,
Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office) (citing § 115(c)(3)(E)).
52. DiMA, Who We Are, http://www.digmedia.org/content/aboutus.cfm

?content=who (last visited Oct. 28, 2006).
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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giants such as AOL, Apple, Microsoft, Napster, RealNetworks,
and Yahoo.3 These are just a few of the companies responsible
for providing legally licensed music online to consumers. Led by
Executive Director, Jonathan Potter, DiMA has been at the
forefront of ensuring that the law, specifically Section 115 of the
Copyright Act, does not disadvantage digital music providers. 4
However, this has been an uphill battle that is far from over.
Jonathan Potter and DiMA recognize that its member companies
are up against a serious foe: the online black market for pirated
music. 5
Across the world, there are over 360 legal digital music services
providing over 3 million songs to consumers. 6 For the United
States, this amounted to a $1.1 billion market in 2005. 5' However,
the International Federation of Phonogram and Videogram
Producers estimates that nearly twenty billion songs were illegally
downloaded worldwide in 2005.58 Jonathan Potter and DiMA
believe that by modernizing Section 115 of the Copyright Act, its
member companies will be able to better compete with piracy in
the marketplace. 9
In DiMA's eyes, there are many problems with the current
Section 115 compulsory mechanical license.
First, the
administrative requirements mandated by the statute and the
Copyright Office are "so cumbersome as to be dysfunctional. 6 °
When only roughly twenty percent of musical works are registered
with the Copyright Office, finding copyright owners to provide
notice of intent to use, as required under § 115(b)(1), can be a
tedious proposition.6 ' Moreover, copyright ownership information

53. DiMA Members, http://www.digmedia.org/content/joinDima.cfm

?content =members (last visited Oct. 28, 2006).
54. See DiMA, Who We Are, supra note 52.
55. See 2004 Hearing, supra note 5, at 43 (statement of Jonathan Potter,
Executive Director, Digital Media Association).
56. The Recording Industry 2006 Piracy Report: Protecting Creativity in
Music 6 (2006), http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/piracy-report2006.pdf.

57. Id.
58. Id.
at 4.
59. 2004 Hearing, supra note 5, at 43 (statement of Jonathan Potter,
Executive Director, Digital Media Association).

60. Id. at 51.
61. Id. at 52.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss1/3
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for pre-1978 works is only available on card files at the Copyright
Office, which requires a manual search for each individual song.62
For those copyright owners that are identified, licensees must send
via certified or registered mail, monthly statements of use and
royalty payments using a two-page form for each composition.6 3
Finally, for those unidentified copyright owners, the licensee must
file a form with the Copyright Office, as well as pay a $12
administrative fee per composition.' Taking into account the fact
that roughly twenty-five percent of copyright owners cannot be
located,65 the plight of the legitimate startup online digital music
provider that wants to license 1 million songs all at once is
obvious: If twenty-five percent of the copyright owners are not
located, the digital music provider potentially faces $3 million in
fees on 250,000 songs. Then consider that this legitimate licensee
is competing with a black market that has no registration forms, no
licensing fees, and will have every song illegally available online
while the legitimate licensee spends weeks filling out forms and
searching for copyright owners.66 In DiMA's view, this scenario
makes it far too cost prohibitive to compete with, and offer the
same amount of content as, the black market.67
However, administrative dysfunction is not the only factor
The Section 115
plaguing DiMA's member companies.
compulsory license allows a licensee to "make and distribute" a
reproduction of a nondramatic musical work.6 8 But as DiMA and
its member companies recognize, "[flor online services, . . . not
every fixation or reproduction is intended for distribution, because
many reproductions necessarily occur in the electronic process of
delivering a download."6 9 Therefore, a literal interpretation of
Section 115 means that those reproductions that are necessary to
the distribution process, but are not in themselves distributed, e.g.,
62. Id.
63. Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(5) (2006).
64. 2004 Hearing, supra note 5, at 52 (statement of Jonathan Potter,
Executive Director, Digital Media Association).

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. § 115(a)(1).
69. 2004 Hearing, supra note 5, at 53 (statement of Jonathan Potter,
Executive Director, Digital Media Association).
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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server, cache, and buffer copies, are not subject to the compulsory
license.7" If this is the case, it necessarily follows that online
digital music providers are infringing on the rights of copyright
owners who have not licensed, nor been paid royalties for, the use
of such incidental copies. 7' Indeed, at least one court has held that
because server copies are not intended for distribution, Section 115
does not afford a right to a compulsory license for such copies.72
DiMA believes such a ruling is absurd because Congress could not
have intended a compulsory license to "be accompanied by a
direct license for the very same work with respect to the very same
activity."73 Without clarifying that incidental copies necessary to
the process of distributing a digital phonorecord online are part of
the compulsory license, digital music providers could be subject to
crushing liability, considering statutory damages can be as high as
$150,000 per infringement of each copyrightable work.74
DiMA member companies are also concerned about what rights
are implicated in regards to on-demand streams and limited
downloads.75
In 2001, in an agreement (hereinafter "The
RIAA/HFA Agreement") between the Recording Industry
Association of America ("RIAA"), the National Music Publishers'
Association, Inc. ("NMPA"), and the Harry Fox Agency, Inc.
("HFA"), an "on-demand stream" was defined as:
[A]n on-demand, real-time digital transmission of a
sound recording of a single musical work to allow a
user to listen to a particular sound recording chosen
by the user at a time chosen by the user, using
streaming technology... so that such transmission
will not result in a substantially complete
reproduction of a sound recording being made on a
local storage device ... so that such reproduction is
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Rodgers & Hammerstein Org. v. UMG Recordings Inc., 60 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1354, 1360 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
73. 2004 Hearing, supra note 5, at 54 (statement of Jonathan Potter,
Executive Director, Digital Media Association).

74. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006).
75. 2004 Hearing, supra note 5, at 24 (statement of Jonathan Potter,
Executive Director, Digital Media Association).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss1/3
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available for listening other than at... the time of

transmission.76
A "limited download" was defined as:
[A] digital transmission of a time-limited or other
use-limited download of a sound recording of a
single musical work to a local storage device ...
using technology designed to cause the downloaded
file to be available for listening only either (1)
during a limited time... or (2) for a limited number
of times.... ."
For on-demand streaming services, the copyright owner's public
performance right is implicated."
Performance rights
organizations such as the American Society of Composers,
Authors, and Publishers ("ASCAP"), Broadcast Music, Inc.
("BMI"), and the Society of European Stage Authors and
Composers ("SESAC") receive performance royalties for ondemand streams, which they then distribute to publishers and
songwriters after subtracting a fee.79 However, "music publishers

claim a mechanical right is implicated by the server copies and
other reproductions of the composition which are merely intended
to facilitate the licensed performance."8 In fact, the RIAA/HFA
Agreement solidified the music publishers' claim by providing that
"[a] license with respect to a musical work includes all
reproduction, distribution and DPD rights necessary... to make
On-Demand Streams ...

."81 Still, as the Copyright Office noted,

the key issue is whether an on-demand stream fits the definition of

76. Agreement Between Recording Indus. Assoc. of Am., Nat'l Music
Publishers Assoc., and Harry Fox Agency § 1.2 (Oct. 5, 2001),

http://www.copyright.gov/carp/10-5agreement.pdf

[hereinafter RJAA, NMPA,

HFA Agreement].

77. Id. § 1.3.
78. 2004 Hearing, supra note 5, at 24 (statement of Jonathan Potter,

Executive Director, Digital Media Association).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. RIAA, NMPA, HFA Agreement, supra note 76, § 1.3.
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a DPD" If an on-demand stream does not create a "phonorecord
by digital transmission of a sound recording which results in a
specifically identifiable reproduction by or for any transmission,"
it cannot be considered a DPD regardless of what parties stipulate
to through contract. 3 In DiMA's view, on-demand streams are
like broadcast radio, and the only royalty that broadcast radio pays
is performance royalties. 4 Therefore, in DiMA's view, online
radio should be treated equal to broadcast radio, rather than be
forced to pay a "double dip" mechanical royalty as well.85
According to DiMA, there is also ambiguity under § 115(c)(4)86
as to whether limited downloads are licensable." The RIAA/HFA
agreement specifically covers subscription services providing that
limited downloads are licensable under § 115. DiMA companies,
however, state that some publishers disagree." The question of §
115(c)(4)'s applicability to subscription services may stem from
the fact that the "subscription payment is not tied to a specific
work that is being licensed."89 However, the Copyright Office
believes that "the delivery of a digital download, whether limited
or otherwise ... appears to fit the statutory [DPD] definition, since

82. 2004 Hearing, supra note 5, at 12 (statement of Marybeth Peters,
Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office); see also supra text
accompanying note 40.
83. 2004 Hearing, supra note 5, at 12 (statement of Marybeth Peters,
Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 115(d)
(2006)).
84. Digital Music Licensing and Section 115 of the Copyright Act: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and IntellectualPropertyof the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 20 (2004) [hereinafter March 2005
Hearing] (testimony of Jonathan Potter, Executive Director, Digital Media
Association).
85. Id.
86. "A compulsory license under this section includes the right of the maker
of a phonorecord or a nondramatic musical work.., to distribute or authorize
distribution of such phonorecord by rental, lease, or lending .... " 17 U.S.C. §
1 15(c)(4) (2006).
87. 2004 Hearing, supra note 5, at 24 (statement of Jonathan Potter,
Executive Director, Digital Media Association).
Also note that the 2004
Hearingincorrectly labels the statutory section as 11 5(g)( 4 ).
88. Id.; see also RIAA, NMPA, HFA Agreement, supra note 76, § 1.1.
89. 2004 Hearing, supra note 5, at 24 (statement of Jonathan Potter,
Executive Director, Digital Media Association).
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it must result in an identifiable reproduction in order for the
recipient to listen to the work embodied in the phonorecord at his
leisure."9
2. The NationalMusic Publishers Association and the Harry Fox
Agency
With over 700 members, the National Music Publishers
Association ("NMPA") is the largest music publishing trade
association in the United States.9" Music publishers "represent[ ]
the interests of songwriters by promoting their songs; by
publishing their songs in sheet music; and by licensing the use of
their songs for reproduction and distribution in CD's, on the
Internet, through public performances, and exercising the other
rights available under the copyright law."9"A typical arrangement
between the music publisher and the songwriter splits all licensing
royalties received, with about 75% going to the songwriter and
25% going to the publisher.9 3 The NMPA established the Harry
Fox Agency ("HFA") in 1927, and it is now the dominant agency
for mechanical licensing, collections, and distributions of royalties
for music publishers.9 4
Contrary to the views of DiMA, the NMPA and HFA painted
quite a different picture of the functioning of the Section 115
mechanical license. At the 2004 hearing addressing Section 115,
the NMPA stated that no changes to the compulsory licensing
provisions were needed.9 5 According to the NMPA, the HFA does

90. Id. at 13 (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, U.S.
Copyright Office).
91. NMPA Mission Statement, http://www.nmpa.org/aboutnmpa/index.asp
(last visited August 23, 2007).
92. 2004 Hearing, supra note 5, at 31 (statement of Carey R. Ramos on
behalf of the National Music Publishers Association).
93. Id.
94. About HFA, http://www.harryfox.com/public/HFAHome.jsp (last visited
August 23, 2007). HFA represents more than 27,000 music publishers, which in
turn represent more than 160,000 songwriters. March 2005 Hearing,supra note
84, at 11 (statement of David M. Israelite, President and CEO, Nat'l Music
Publishers Assoc. ("NMPA")).
95. 2004 Hearing, supra note 5, at 33 (statement of Carey R. Ramos on
behalf of the National Music Publishers Association).
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bulk, electronic licensing with a turnaround time of four hours
upon license request.96 As evidence that Section 115 is not an
impediment to consumer demand for online music, the NMPA
pointed to the success of iTunes.97 In fact, in the NMPA's view,
"critics of section 115 should have spent less time lobbying
Congress and more time developing products that U.S. consumers
of music actually desired."98 Furthermore, the NMPA stressed that
the HFA had "every economic incentive to issue as many licenses
to new, legitimate Internet music services as possible."99 After all,
the only way the music publishers are going to be compensated is
though valid licensing agreements.' 0 Furthermore, by March
2004, through the HFA, the NMPA issued over 1.75 million
licenses to thirty-nine digital music provider companies." 1 Only a
year later, the NMPA issued 2.85 million licenses to 215 different
digital music licensees.0 2 Though there are many obscure songs
not represented by the HFA and for which it cannot issue a license,
the HFA licenses "over ninety percent of the commercially
significant music that is distributed in the United States ....

"03

The NMPA and the HFA believe that they have taken the
necessary steps to deter theft and provide licenses to legitimate
online music services."° As a testament to their dedication for
licensing digital music to online providers, the NMPA points to the
RIAA/HFA Agreement of 2001.05 That agreement "assist[ed] the
launch of new subscription services by creating a framework for
mechanical licensing of such services to offer tethered

96. Id. at 32.
97. Id. at 33. By March 2004, iTunes had already made 30 million
downloads since its launch less than a year prior. Id. at 32.
98. Id. at 34.
99. Id. at 33.
100. Id.
101. 2004 Hearing, supra note 5, at 33 (statement of Carey R. Ramos on
behalf of the National Music Publishers Association).
102. March 2005 Hearing, supra note 84, at 12 (statement of David M.
Israelite, President and CEO, NMPA).
103. 2004 Hearing, supra note 5, at 31 (statement of Carey R. Ramos on
behalf of the National Music Publishers Association).
104. March 2005 Hearing, supra note 84, at 11 (statement of David M.
Israelite, President and CEO, NMPA).
105. Id.; see also supra notes 75-90 and accompanying text.
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downloads1 6 and on-demand streams despite the fact that
agreement had yet to be reached as to the applicable royalty
rates."'0 7 The agreement also stated that in the event the HFA does
not have the authority to license a particular musical work, the
HFA would make "reasonable efforts to secure the requested
[1]icenses from the relevant non-HFA publisher-principals on the
same terms as apply to HFA publisher-principals under this
[a]greement."'0 8 Also, the HFA woud provide licenses to the
RIAA in bulk, thereby allowing subscription services to offer an
extensive library of music to subscribers.0 9
While endorsing the RIAA/HFA Agreement, the NMPA also
sought to caution Congress from making legislative changes
simply because technology had changed."0 For this argument, the
NMPA attacked the Section 104 Digital Millennium Copyright
Act Report.'. (hereinafter DMCA Report) by the Copyright Office,
which claimed that temporary buffer copies incidental to the
streaming of copyrighted music have no economic value, and that
such copies should fall under the fair use doctrine." 2 The DMCA
Report also claimed that because copyrighted owners and music
publishers are already compensated for the public performance of
a stream, they "appear to be seeking a second compensation for the
same activity merely because of the happenstance that the
transmission technology implicates the reproduction right, and the
reproduction right of songwriters and music publishers is
106. A tethered download is, for all intents and purposes, the same as a
limited download. See supranote 77 and accompanying text for a definition.
107. March 2005 Hearing, supra note 84, at 11 (statement of David M.
Israelite, President and CEO, NMPA).
108. RIAA, NMPA, HFA Agreement, supra note 76, at § 3.5.

109. March 2005 Hearing, supra note 84, at I I (statement of David M.
Israelite, President and CEO, NMPA); see also RJAA, NMPA, HFA Agreement,

supra note 76, § 3.1.
110. 2004 Hearing, supra note 5, at 35 (statement of Carey R. Ramos on
behalf of the National Music Publishers Association).
111. The NMPA notes that the DMCA Report only acknowledged radiostyle webcasting, but to the extent that the same logic might be applied to ondemand streams, the NMPA strongly argues against it. See id. at 34-35.

112. Id. at 34 (citing U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT
at xxiv (2001), availableat http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca
/dmcastudy.html (follow "Volume 1" hyperlink) [hereinafter DMCA SECTION
104 REPORT]).
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administered by a different collective than the public performance
right.""' 3 The NMPA pointed out that the DMCA Report predates
the RIAA/HFA agreement, which states a mechanical license is
implicated for on-demand streams."1 To hold that buffer copies
made during streaming are fair use is, in the NMPA's view, legally
incorrect and would violate the fair use doctrine." 5 As the NMPA
pointed out, the DMCA Report conceded "that the doctrine of fair
use 'is limited to copying by others which does not materially
impair the marketability of the work which is copied'.""' 6
According to the NMPA, on-demand streams have impaired the
117
marketability of musical works by displacing record sales.
Consumers need not purchase a CD when on-demand 8 streams
provide the songs consumers want when they want them."
Furthermore, the NMPA rejected the use of the term "temporary
buffer copy.""' 9 In 2002, the NMPA hired an expert in computer
streaming technology. 2 This expert determined that buffer copies
are not exactly temporary because they are "saved permanently on
This
the hard-drive of a consumer's computer in a 'cache'.''
on
playback
of
"immediate
benefit
the
provides to the consumer
demand of the previously streamed content, and continuous
playback in case the internet connection is unstable.' ' 2

The

NMPA argued that because technology is constantly evolving, to
categorically define temporary buffer copies as exempt from
copyright law would be to provide a loophole by which technology
companies could deprive copyright owners of their just
compensation, simply by using technology barely meeting the
113. DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT, supra note 112, at 143.
114. 2004 Hearing, supra note 5, at 34 (statement of Carey R. Ramos on
behalf of the National Music Publishers Association).
115. Id.
116. Id. (quoting DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT, supra note 112, at 138

(quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566-67
(1985))).

117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 35.
120. 2004 Hearing, supra note 5, at 35 (statement of Carey R. Ramos on
behalf of the National Music Publishers Association).
121. Id.
122. Id.
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definition. 123
Ultimately, the NMPA believes that Section 115 compulsory
licensing should be eliminated altogether, but due to Congress's
unwillingness to entertain that possibility, the NMPA did vow, in
to assist in the Section 115
subsequent congressional hearings,
124
uses.
digital
licensing reform for
3. The Songwriters Guild ofAmerica
The Songwriters Guild of America ("SGA") is the largest and
oldest songwriters organization in the United States.' 25 It is run
exclusively by and for songwriters, and consists of roughly five
thousand members.'26 The SGA's operations include music
licensing, royalty collections, and auditing for its members. 127 The
plight of the songwriter can best be described by a statement
issued by Rick Carnes, a songwriter and SGA's president, at a
2006 hearing discussing an early draft version of SIRA:
Under the present compulsory licensing provisions,
a songwriter is to receive 9.1 cents per song on any
CD ("phonorecord") manufactured and distributed,
or legally downloaded, in the United States. So, if
one of my songs appears on a million selling album,
I am theoretically due $91,000 by statute.
However, I split that money half and half with my
That leaves me
music publisher by contract.
$45,000. Then I must split that in half again with
the recording artist who co-wrote the song with me,
leaving me with $22,750. Practically every artist
now co-writes every song on his or her album with
the primary songwriter, because the record labels
123. Id.
124. Discussion Draft of the Section 115 Reform Act (SIRA) of 2006:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and IntellectualProperty
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 11 (2006) [hereinafter 2006

Hearing] (statement of David M. Israelite, President and CEO, NMPA).
125. Id. at 20 (testimony of Rick Carnes, President, Songwriters Guild of
Am. ("SGA")).
126. Id.
127. Id.
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have included a controlled composition clause in
every new artist's contract that makes it financially
ruinous for the artist to record more than one or two
tracks that he or she did not co-write. The reason
the record companies do this is so they can pay the
artist, and his or her co-writer, 75% of the statutory
mechanical royalty rate . . .Thus, after all is said

and done, I end up making less than $17,000 for
having a song on a million selling CD. Of course,
given that the retail charge to consumers for a CD
may be as high as $18, a million sales will generate
28
up to $18 million for someone.'

Many songwriters these days are simply unable to support
themselves, let alone their families, under the current royalty
system and have had to leave the profession despite artistic
success.'29 This is due in part to the fact that the 1909 statutory
mechanical royalty rate of two cents per song was not raised until
1978.13 Had the mechanical rate increased proportionate to the
Consumer Price Index, the rate would currently be 40 cents per
song, not 9.1 cents.'
The SGA supports reform of Section 115 of the Copyright Act,
as long as any new legislation addresses some of its concerns.
Probably the most important issue to the SGA is resolving what it
calls the "gatekeeper" problem.'32 The gatekeeper problem refers
to the "current ability of record companies to authorize the digital
distribution of nondramatic musical works embodied in a sound
recording."' 33 Many record companies sell digital music through
providers like Apple's iTunes. 3 4 The record company can provide
both the right in the sound recording and the right in the
underlying musical work to digital music providers under the
128. Id.at 23.
129. Id. at 22.
130. 2006 Hearing, supra note 124, at 23 (testimony of Rick Cares,
President, SGA).
131. Id. at 8 (statement of David M. Israelite, President and CEO, NMPA).
132. Id. at 25 (testimony of Rick Cames, President, SGA).
133. Id.
134. Id.at 36 (statement of Cary H. Sherman, President, Recording Indus.
Assoc. Am. ("RIAA")).
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current system, completely interposing themselves between the
digital music providers and the songwriters and music
publishers.'3 5
The SGA believes part of the reason record
companies do this is so they can continue to enforce controlled
composition clauses in their artists' contracts, and pay artists and
songwriters seventy-five percent of the mechanical rate.'3 6
Eliminating record companies' ability to be the gatekeepers of the
copyrighted works held by songwriters and music publishers will
not only improve the fairness of royalty distribution, but it will
also improve transparency, allowing for direct financial reporting
and auditing rights between the digital music providers and the
copyright owners of the musical works.'3 7
Another important piece to any new legislation, according to the
SGA, is that if an interactive stream is to be licensable under
Section 115, it should be clarified that an interactive stream
constitutes a DPD.
This is important because when determining
the value of interactive streams, the songwriters and music
publishers want to be discussing the value of a DPD, something
everyone can understand.'39 Furthermore, when determining the
value of the server copies that facilitate interactive streaming, the
SGA believes significant weight should be given to previous
negotiated rates for server copies. 4 ' This is important because in
the first place, the SGA does not believe that server copies must
necessarily fall under the mechanical compulsory license.' 4 ' For
support, the SGA cites Rodgers and Hammerstein Organization v.
UMG Recordings, Inc., which held that licensing for server copies
was outside Section 115's scope and that such licensing is among
the exclusive rights held by copyright owners. 4 ' Therefore, if the
135. Id.
136. 2006 Hearing, supra note 124, at 20 (testimony of Rick Carnes,
President, SGA).
137. Id. at25.
138. Id. at26.
139. Id. at 44-45 (statement of David M. Israelite, President and CEO,
NMPA).
140. Id. at 27 (testimony of Rick Carnes, President, SGA).

141. Id. at 26.
142. 2006 Hearing, supra note 124, at 26 (testimony of Rick Carnes,
President, SGA) (citing Rodgers & Hammerstein Org. v. UMG Recordings Inc.,
60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1354 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)).
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SGA is going to concede that server copies are licensable under
Section 115, the SGA wants to ensure a fair rate for such copies.' 43
4. The Recording Industry Association ofAmerica
The Recording Industry Association of America ("RIAA") is the
trade organization representing record companies.'" Its member
companies create and/or distribute roughly ninety percent of all
legitimate sound recordings sold in the United States.'45 Because
the RIAA's mission is "to foster a business and legal climate that
supports and promotes [its] members' creative and financial
vitality," it fights to protect intellectual property rights throughout
the world.'46 As the RIAA recognizes, piracy is a big issue in the
music industry.'47 From 1999 to 2004, record companies had seen
their revenue decline by over fifteen percent.'48 In order to combat
piracy, RIAA members are doing their part by creating new
products that they hope will excite consumers and steer them away
from illegal downloading.

49

One of the new products record companies began trying to offer
in 2004 was the multisession disc. 5° These discs have the ability
to contain a traditional CD album on one side and the same album
for DVD players on the other side.' 5 ' Record companies hope that
offering a product with a higher quality than a CD, which allows
consumers to play the music on whatever players they have, will
52
give consumers a compelling reason to turn away from piracy.'
Yet, while it was the belief of the record companies that the
143. Id. at 27 (testimony of Rick Carnes, President, SGA).
144. See RIAA, Who We Are, http://www.riaa.com/aboutus.php (last visited
Aug. 20, 2007).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. 2004 Hearing, supra note 5, at 39 (statement of Cary H. Sherman,
President, RIAA).
148. 2006 Hearing, supra note 124, at 37 (statement of Cary H. Sherman,

President, RIAA).
149. 2004 Hearing, supra note 5, at 41 (statement of Cary H. Sherman,
President, RIAA).

150. Id. at 40.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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Section 115 mechanical license governed multisession discs and
only one royalty payment per disc should be required, the HFA
argued that a mechanical license was needed for each separate
session.'53 Therefore under the HFA's view, a mechanical license
should be required for a song in CD format and another
mechanical license should be required for the same song in DVD
format, even though both formats are on the same disc.' 54 In fact,
the HFA refused to grant licenses for multisession discs without
specific publisher consent.'5 5 As a result, record companies were
prevented "from issuing new products for which there was
consumer demand that could have helped everyone in the music
industry sell more physical goods."' 56 Only until recently have
publishers begun to agree that multiple mechanical licenses should
not be required for multisession discs.'57 Still, the RIAA would
like to codify this understanding to prevent future problems.'58
According to the RIAA, another problem lies in the infeasibility
of applying a penny-rate royalty to some of the newer product
offerings.'59
Record companies concede that the penny-rate
royalty worked well when there were only a few types of physical
products. 60 However, now there is a range of products, "including
not only multisession discs but preloaded offerings that consumers
can 'unlock' through online transactions; offerings with bonus
material; products with digital rights management systems that
allow limited personal use copying, and subscription devices that
offer both streams and limited downloads for a single monthly
fee."''
The RIAA argues that because such products are
"distributed through different channels and have different
economics," the penny rate will often be "impossible and
153. Id.

154. Id.
155. 2004 Hearing, supra note 5, at 41 (statement of Cary H. Sherman,
President, RIAA).
156. 2006 Hearing, supra note 124, at 38 (statement of Cary H. Sherman,

President, RIAA).
157. Id. at 41.
158. Id. at 41-42.
159. 2004 Hearing, supra note 5, at 40 (statement of Cary H. Sherman,

President, RIAA).
160. Id.
161. Id.
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economically infeasible" to apply.162 On the other hand, the RIAA
believes that a percentage royalty which can offer the flexibility to
adjust rates frequently, as well 16 as
readily address new product
3
offerings, is much more suitable.
III. H.R. 6052: THE SECTION 115 REFORM ACT WITHIN
THE COPYRIGHT MODERNIZATION ACT
On September 12, 2006, Representative Lamar Smith of Texas
introduced the Copyright Modernization Act, which was referred
to the Committee on the Judiciary. 64 Title I of this legislation, the
Section 115 Reform Act, the sole subject of this article, attempts to
address the mechanical licensing of musical works in digital65
delivery form by amending Section 115 of the Copyright Act.
The legislation governs "the making and distribution of general
and incidental digital phonorecord deliveries in the form of full
downloads, limited downloads, interactive streams, and any other
form constituting a digital phonorecord delivery or hybrid offering
.... 166 To be clear, the legislation specifically includes that the
license will cover incidental reproductions such as cached,
67
network, and RAM buffer copies for the deliveries listed above.
However, for noninteractive streams, the legislation creates an
exemption, providing that digital music providers cannot be found
to have infringed the exclusive rights of copyright owners of
musical works when they make server or incidental reproductions,
i.e., cached, network, or RAM buffer copies, "to facilitate
noninteractive streaming or terrestrial radio analog broadcasts ...
"168
The legislation provides further that this exemption will not
apply if the digital music provider engaging in noninteractive
streaming takes affirmative steps to allow an end user to make
reproductions of the musical works for future listening.'69

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 41.
Id.
Copyright Modernization Act of 2006, H.R. 6052, 109th Cong. (2006).
See id.§ 102.
Id. § 102(e)(1)(A).
Id. § 102(e)(1)(B)(iii).
Id.§ 102(e)(3)(A).
Id. § 102(e)(3)(A)(ii).
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To administer the license, the legislation creates a General
Designated Agent and allows for additional designated agents.' 70
The General Designated Agent is the default agent responsible for
administering licenses and collecting and distributing royalties to
copyright owners.' 7 ' Appointed by the Register of Copyrights, it
will be the duty of the "mechanical licensing and collection agency
representing music publishing entities that represent the greatest
share of the music publishing market ...to establish and operate

the General Designated Agent."' 72 All designated agents are
authorized to, in the interest of music publishers and songwriters,
"engage in . . . industry negotiations, ratesetting proceedings,
litigation, and legislative efforts; and apply any administrative fees
or other funds it collects to support the activities
Additionally, the Copyright Royalty Judges will determine a
mechanism for cost-sharing as well as the amounts to be paid by
licensees to designated agents.'74 The legislation provides that a
five-member board of directors consisting of representatives of
music publishing entities and two professional songwriters will
govern the General Designated Agent.'75 Furthermore, "[a]ll
members of the board of directors have a fiduciary duty to the
publishing entities and songwriters that the board represents."' 76
Copyright owners may elect to be represented by a designated
agent other than the General Designated Agent provided the
Register of Copyrights certifies the agent.'77 In order to be
certified, additional designated agents must "represent at least a
fifteen percent share of the music publishing market ... ."1" Each
designated agent will maintain a database, available free of charge
to licensees, that contains information about the musical works
available for licensing, which the agent represents. "

Upon receipt

of a properly completed application by a digital music provider, a
170. H.R. 6052 § 102(e)(9)(A).

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. §
Id. §
Id. §
Id. §
Id. §
H.R.
Id. §
Id. §
Id. §

102(e)(9)(B)(i)(II).
102(e)(9)(B)(i)(I).
102(e)(9)(D)(ii), (iii).
102(e)(12)(A)
102(e)(9)(B)(i)(1I)(aa), (bb).
6052 § 102(e)(9)(B)(i)(II)(dd).
102(e)(9)(C)(ii)(1).
102(e)(9)(C)(i)(I).
102(e)(9)(H)(i)
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designated agent will administer a blanket license for all
copyrighted nondramatic musical works represented by the
agent."' Licensees may assume that any musical work not found
to be represented by any designated agent is represented by the
General Designated Agent. 8 ' Licensees will prepare quarterly
reports to the appropriate designated agent of the "usage of
musical works under the license, and make royalty payments by
reason of such usage." '82 Designated agents will then distribute to

copyright owners on a quarterly basis royalties collected from the
licensees.Y"3
Additionally, designated agents must annually
provide copyright owners the information from the quarterly
reports received from the digital music providers.'
Those
royalties for which designated agents cannot reasonably locate the
entitled copyright owner will be held for at least three years,
allowing a copyright owner time to come forth and claim the
funds. 85
'
In the event of a dispute concerning whether a licensee has
underpaid a designated agent, the designated agent may conduct a
royalty compliance examination of the licensee.'86 The designated
agent is responsible for notifying the licensee of any claim
resulting from the examination, but only after considering any
written rebuttal by the licensee.' 87 The licensee will bear the costs
of the examination if the designated agent determines that the
licensee underpaid royalties by ten percent or more.'88 Otherwise,
the designated agent will bear the costs of the examination. 9 If a
licensee fails to submit quarterly usage reports or fails to pay
royalties for such usage of musical works when due, a designated
180. Id. § 102(e)(5).
181. Id. § 102(e)(9)(H)(i).
182. H.R. 6052 § 102(e)(10)(A)(i).
183. Id. § 102(e)(l1)(A).
184. Id. § 102(e)(10)(D). In the case where the music publisher is the
copyright owner, the designated agent must, upon request, provide the same
information received from the digital music provider to the songwriter. Id. §
102(e)( 1l)(E)(i).

185.
186.
187.
188.

Id.§
Id.§
Id.§
H.R.

102(e)( 1)(B)(ii)().
102(e)(10)(B).
102(e)(10)(B)(iii).
6052 § 102(e)(10)(B)(iv).

189. Id.
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agent may provide notice that if the default is not remedied within
thirty days, the license will automatically terminate. 9
Those
musical works that are the subject of the default will then be
actionable as acts of infringement, subject to the remedies of
sections 502 through 506 and 509 of the Copyright Act.'9 '
A copyright owner may also elect to have their royalties
distributed directly to a record company by submitting a letter of
direction to the designated agent.'92 Letters of direction permit
recording companies to recoup advances made to copyright
owners in the course of a contract made between a copyright
owner and a recording company."' Furthermore, for any contract
between a sound recording company and digital music provider
whereby the sound recording company is already licensing musical
works embodied in particular sound recordings for use in the form
of a DPD, the sound recording company may elect to retain the
right to be paid directly by the digital music provider and thereby
distribute the necessary royalties to the copyright owner of the
musical work.'9 4
The Copyright Royalty Judges will initiate a proceeding to
determine the royalty rates and terms for all activities licensable
under SIRA.' 95 For any activity licensable under SIRA, a digital
music provider will, "upon filing a valid application with the
relevant designated agent, have a license . . . to engage in the
activity.. ." regardless of whether final royalty rates or terms have
been set for the activity.'96 This is subject to the establishment of
an interim royalty rate, which can be negotiated between the
digital music provider and the designated agent or be determined
by the Copyright Royalty Judges.'9 7 Additionally, the Copyright
Royalty Judges are responsible for determining a mechanism by
which the licensee digital music providers will share in the costs
associated with the administration of the license by the designated

190. Id. at § 102(e)(10)(C)(i)(1), (II).
191. Id.
192. Id. at § 102(e)(9)(I)(i)(I).

193. Id.
194. H.R. 6052 § 102(e)(13)(A)(i).
195. Id. § 102(e)(8)(C)(i).
196. Id. § 102(e)(8)(D)(i).
197. Id. § 102(e)(8)(D)(ii)(I), (II)(bb).
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agents.'98
IV. ANALYSIS
On September 27, 2006, Representative Lamar Smith pulled the
Copyright Modernization Act from consideration for a vote, but
vowed to resume discussions in 2007.'9

The failure of this bill to

leave committee can be attributed to a host of issues upon which
the parties involved ultimately could not reach agreement.
Detailed below is a discussion about the major parts of the bill,
some of which were agreed upon, but most of which were hotly
contested.
A. The Blanket License
Perhaps one of the most important issues in the legislation, and
one that actually everyone could agree upon, was the idea of a
blanket license for musical works. If there was one issue truly
preventing DiMA member companies from licensing a large
amount of works at one time, it was the restrictions under the
current Section 115, which require licensing of musical works on a
song-by-song basis, by notifying each individual copyright
owner."0 Even if the HFA can license a majority of the most
popular musical works through a blanket license, that still does not
compete with the availability of all the musical works one could
ever desire that can be found on a number of pirate websites. The
ability to license a large amount of works by filling out one or a
few applications to the various designated agents not only cuts
down on the administrative costs suffered through individual song
licensing by digital music providers, but it also increases the speed
and efficiency by which digital music providers can offer content.
One of the most beneficial qualities of the blanket license,
proposed in Section 115(e)(9)(H)(i), allows for the licensing of all
musical works, regardless of whether the copyright owner could be
198. Id. § 102(e)(12)(A).
199. See Full Committee Markup of H.R. 6052, http://judiciary.house.gov
/markup.aspx?ID=148 (follow "Video Webcast" hyperlink) (last visited Dec.
29, 2006).

200. See 17 U.S.C. § 115(b)(l) (2006).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss1/3
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found.2"' The current system, basically paralyzed the HFA from
licensing musical works where the copyright owner could not be
found. However, under the proposed legislation, digital music
providers could assume the General Designated Agent represented
any works found not to be in control of any of the designated
agents. This permits digital music providers to offer a wide array
of musical works without the risk of an infringement lawsuit.
B. The CopyrightRoyalty Judges
This legislation was significant as much for what was left out as
what was actually delineated within it. Atop the list of those issues
left unaddressed was royalty rates. While the proposed legislation
allows the Copyright Royalty Judges to initiate ratemaking
proceedings for any activity licensable under the legislation, it
does not specify the type of rate to be used. This leaves open the
possibility of a penny-rate royalty, as under the current legislation,
or the flexibility to move to a percentage of revenue based system.
One of the issues digital music providers and record companies
have with the current Section 115 is how to apply a penny-rate
royalty to some of the new products being offered.2"' Rather than
have that fight now, the parties agreed to fight later over which
royalty system would work best for each product. Another benefit
is that because the license would be granted upon receipt of a
properly completed application, digital music providers and record
companies don't have to fight over the royalty rate of a new
product before that product reaches the market. The legislation
allows them to offer the product and then initiate a proceeding
with the Copyright Royalty Judges.
Not only does the absence of royalty determinations benefit
those entities trying to offer new products to consumers, but it
benefits music publishers and songwriters as well. More products
reaching the market means more royalties to copyright owners.
Had the legislation been technology specific, unknown future
products would face difficulties in obtaining licenses, which is
exactly the problem faced by digital music providers and record
companies today. Had the bill been royalty specific to current
201. See supra text accompanying note 180.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 159-63.
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products, the fights it would generate amongst the parties would
most likely prevent the legislation from ever being passed. 03
While this was another bright spot in the legislation, other
elements spawned disagreement.
C. The GeneralDesignatedAgent andAdditional Designated
Agents
The administration of licenses by designated agents was, in
theory, something the parties agreed on. Part of its appeal stems
from the legislation's attempt to equate mechanical licensing with
performance licensing by ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC. If there is
one thing all the parties would concede, it would be that
performance rights licensing is much easier to do than mechanical
licensing. The performance rights societies are able to license
virtually all musical works via a blanket license, while the HFA
has been unable to license mechanical rights for a significant
amount of musical works, due in part to the refusal of many
publishers to grant the HFA the necessary authority.2 "4 The
legislation remedies this by providing that the General Designated
Agent can license all musical works not found to be licensed by
other designated agents.2"5 The General Designated Agent would
be the HFA, as it currently licenses the largest percentage of music
in the United States, meeting the legislation's requirements.0 6 The
NMPA, of course, does not object to this, as the HFA is its wholly
owned subsidiary. DiMA and the RIAA should follow in support.
Ostensibly, the HFA is in the best position to implement the
mechanisms necessary to administer the licenses, as they already
have much experience in doing so. The only difference now, a
203. Specifically important to publishers and songwriters is the value of
server copies for interactive streams. Had a determination been made that these
copies had no value, both these parties would drop their support of the bill. See
supra text accompanying notes 13 8-43.
204. 2006 Hearing, supra note 124, at 18 (statement of Jonathan Potter,
Executive Director, Digital Media Association).
205. See supra text accompanying note 181.
206. See Copyright Modernization Act of 2006, H.R. 6052, 109th Cong. §
115(e)(9)(B)(i) (2006) ("[T]he Register of Copyrights shall designate a
mechanical licensing and collection agency representing music publishing
entities that represent the greatest share of the music publishing market").
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss1/3
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difference welcomed by DiMA and the RIAA, is that the HFA can
license those works for which the copyright owners cannot be
found.
The proposed legislation also seeks parity with
performance rights societies by requiring that any designated agent
represent at least a fifteen percent share of the publishing
market. °7 This ensures that there would not be a large number of
designated agents, making it easier to find which agent owns
which musical works. This process would also be made easier
because all designated agents would be required to keep searchable
electronic databases of the musical works they represent.2 8
Certain issues regarding designated agents, however, would
have been a cause for concern had the legislation passed. One
such issue is the scope of a designated agent's authority to conduct
royalty compliance examinations. 2 9 Broad sweeping, unchecked
authority is given to the designated agent to not only perform the
examination, but also to make the decision as to whether or not the
licensee has complied with the terms of the license. As the
Copyright Office pointed out, royalty compliance determination in
the context of other compulsory licenses is entrusted to
independent auditors."' 0
Many question why this compulsory
license should be any different. Certainly, it would be difficult for
designated agents to maintain impartiality when they are the ones
allegedly cheated by licensees. The designated agents would also
have an incentive to find errors that amount to ten percent or more
of a discrepancy in royalty payments, since the licensee will then
be forced to bear the costs of the examination. There is also no
appeal process available to licensees under the legislation, should
they wish to dispute the ruling of a designated agent. The
legislation appears to provide no recourse short of refusal to pay,
which would undoubtedly result in not only termination of the
license, but costly legal action against the licensees as well.
Another issue which should be of particular concern to
songwriters as well as digital music providers is the amount of
authority given to designated agents to not only apply
207.
208.
209.
210.

See supra text accompanying note 178.
See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 186-91 and accompanying text.
2006 Hearing, supra note 124, at 65 (statement of the U.S. Copyright

Office).
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"administrative fees or other funds" collected to support
administration of licenses, but to also use those funds for "such
additional activities in the interest of music publishers and
songwriters as the designated agent considers appropriate,
including industry negotiations, ratesetting proceedings, litigation,
and legislative efforts .....""' Designated agents should not be
created for the purpose of lobbying congress. If publishers or
songwriters represented by a designated agent want to engage in
legislative efforts, they may choose to do so through their own
organizations like the NMPA or the SGA. The proposed language
permitting designated agents to use "other funds it collects to
support" its activities suggests that the agent may use copyright
owners' royalties to fund such legislative efforts.2 12 While the
SGA never addressed these provisions, songwriters should be
weary of any legislation that treats the use of royalties in such a
cavalier manner. They should insist that the designated agents be
restricted to expending funds for their main purpose: to "grant and
administer licenses and collect and distribute royalties" to
copyright owners." 3
Furthermore, the legislation is ambiguous as to whether
designated agents could use administrative fees collected from
licensees via the cost sharing provision. When the Copyright
Royalty Judges are determining cost sharing amounts to be paid by
licensees, they can consider "the actual, reasonable costs of
creating and maintaining an infrastructure for activities of
designated agents ... "2"4 The term "activities" has been given a
broad definition under the legislation, which suggests that digital
music providers could be helping to finance legislative lobbying.
Because the interests of digital music providers as licensees will
often conflict with the interests of designated agents as licensors,
the digital music providers could in effect be supporting lobbying
of legislation against their own interests. However, the provision
is ambiguous because the Copyright Royalty Judges are also to
consider "the actual, reasonable costs to designated agents

211. See H.R. 6052 § 102(e)(9)(D)(i)-(iii).
212. Id. § 115(e)(9)(D)(iii).
213. Id. § 115(e)(9)(B)(i)(II).
214. Id. § 115(e)(12)(A)(i)(I).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss1/3
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specifically associated with the administrationof licenses... "1, 21'5
which suggests, perhaps, that money contributed by digital music
providers would only be used to fund the administration of
licenses. However, absent express language restricting the use of
cost sharing funds to administration of licenses, this legislation is a
gamble for digital music providers and, ultimately, one they chose
not to accept.
As the Copyright Office pointed out, another issue is the lack of
language describing how digital music providers would allocate
royalty payments among designated agents, and how designated
agents would distribute royalties to copyright owners. 216 This
would be especially pertinent if the Copyright Royalty Judges
implemented a percentage-of-revenue royalty system for some
offerings, which would make calculations more difficult than when
dealing with a penny-rate system. 21 7 The reason the legislation
may not have addressed this issue is because royalty rates, under
the legislation, were to be determined at a later time by the
Copyright Royalty Judges. 218 Thus, the drafters may have believed
it sensible to allow the Copyright Royalty Judges to also determine
the manner of distribution. In any event, however, this should
have been explained in the legislation rather than left to mere
conjecture. 211
D. The Gatekeeper and the ContinuedEnforcement of Controlled
Composition Clauses
As discussed earlier, songwriters would like to eliminate what
they call the gatekeeper problem, which allows record companies
to authorize the digital distribution of musical works embodied in
a sound recording. 22° By doing so, record companies can enforce
their controlled composition clauses that exist in the recording

215. Id. § 115(e)(12)(A)(i)(lII) (emphasis added).
216. 2006 Hearing, supra note 124, at 66 (statement of the U.S. Copyright

Office).
217. Id.
218. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
219. 2006 Hearing, supra note 124, at 67 (statement of the U.S. Copyright

Office).
220. See supra text accompanying notes 132-37.
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artists' contracts, which allow the record companies to pay the
artist seventy-five percent of the statutory mechanical rate of 9.1
cents. On the one side, there is the desire of the record companies
to continue to enforce their negotiated contracts with recording
artists. On the other side is the desire of the songwriters to be
justly compensated for their efforts. The legislation, through both
the "Letters of Direction" clause and the "Election to Retain Right
to be Paid by Licensee" clause, would allow the record companies
to continue enforcement of controlled composition clauses. Most
likely, had this legislation passed, in nearly every new recording
contract there would be a clause stating that for works written by
the artist, the artist must submit a letter of direction instructing the
designated agent to pay royalties due to the copyright owner to be
paid directly to the recording company. This would allow the
record company to take its twenty-five percent of the mechanical
royalty before distributing the other seventy-five percent to the
copyright owner, thereby enforcing its controlled composition
clause. In fact, such a clause would probably be a deal breaker,
with the recording company insisting on the clause before it agrees
to sign the artist.
This brings up another point. Are controlled composition
What is the incentive for a
clauses actually "negotiated"?
recording artist to agree to such a clause, other than that the artist's
deal may depend on it? The answer is that to say these clauses are
negotiated is to completely ignore the disparity in bargaining
power between a new recording artist and the record company.
The record company holds all the cards. It has the money to not
only advance royalties to an artist to record an album, but also to
print the album, distribute the album, market the album, and get
the artist out on the road touring. Even if one recognizes that the
cost of recording has gone down with the advent of sophisticated
home recording equipment; even if one recognizes that the cost of
distribution has gone down because of the internet and websites
such as myspace.com, which allow an artist to stream its songs and
make them available for sale; one still cannot underestimate the
power of marketing and touring, both of which are very expensive.
It is seldom that a new artist will have the money to support his
own tour, let alone advertise it. Under this context, the artist sits
down with the record company to negotiate.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss1/3
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Even if the publishers and songwriters managed to eliminate the
"Letters of Direction" clause from SIRA, they would still be
impeded by the "Election to Retain Right to be Paid by Licensee"
clause. Not only does this clause allow the record company to
continue to be the gatekeeper between publishers/songwriters and
digital music providers, but it also leaves ambiguity as to whether
the record companies can create new contracts with digital music
providers to provide all the necessary rights for DPDs. It is one
thing to honor the contracts already created between the digital
music providers and the record companies, but it is a completely
different animal to allow record companies to create new contracts
The absence of language
with the digital music providers.
prohibiting such contracts could, in effect, be a giant loophole
through which record companies could continue to impose on the
rights owned by songwriters and publishers.
The other side of this argument touts the efficiency of the record
companies' gatekeeper role. One of the policies behind SIRA was
to make licenses easier to obtain than under the current system. If
record companies are already successfully providing both the
rights in the sound recording and the musical work to digital music
providers such as iTunes, why disrupt that practice? In fact, by
requiring digital music providers to go to one licensing agent to
obtain the rights in the sound recording, and another licensor for
the rights in the musical work, more administrative costs would
burden the digital music providers. Furthermore, as the RIAA
pointed out, all deals between record companies and the digital
music providers are negotiated in the market place, and rates differ
from contract to contract."' To nullify these contracts would only
increase the administrative burdens. It would force digital music
providers to not only obtain separate licenses for rights in the
sound recording and musical work, but it would also force them to
renegotiate rates for the rights in the sound recordings.
Still, while such administrative burdens may be of concern to
the RIAA, they may not be to DiMA. DiMA simply wants more
licenses, regardless of how it gets them.222 Certainly, transparency
221. 2006 Hearing, supra note 124, at 37 (statement of Cary H. Sherman,
President, RIAA).
222. Id. at 19 (statement of Jonathan Potter, Executive Director, Digital
Media Association) ("DiMA members are ready, willing and able to pay
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and auditing functions would be enhanced if publishers and
songwriters were dealing directly with digital music providers.
Through such direct dealings, publishers and songwriters would
have first hand knowledge of all reported uses of their copyrighted
works and would be in a better position to question reported usage.
However, whether that is reason enough to nullify the contracts
between record companies and digital music providers is another
issue. Increased access for publishers and songwriters to reports
prepared by digital music providers for record companies under
existing contracts could increase transparency without going so far
as to nullify those existing contracts. In any event, the abovediscussed provisions could ultimately not be agreed upon and were
no doubt part of the reason this bill did not pass.
E. The Arbitrary Distinctionbetween Interactive andNoninteractive Streaming
The proposed legislation makes a distinction between interactive
and non-interactive streaming.
The rationale for doing so,
however, is based more upon business negotiation than statutory
definition. Interactive streams are considered DPDs, and all of the
copies necessary to facilitate the streams are licensable.223
However, the copies necessary to facilitate non-interactive
streaming are exempt from licensing, allowing digital music
providers to make such royalty-free copies without infringing the
exclusive rights of copyright owners.224 This agreement reached
between the parties does have its benefits, insofar as it offers
clarification on a widely disputed issue. It allows digital music
providers to proceed with business plans and the offering of
products knowing exactly which products require licenses.
Without such a clarification, digital music providers would be
forced to engage in protracted negotiations, with publishers
arguing that interactive streams do constitute DPDs requiring a
mechanical license, leaving digital music providers forced to
concede that point and argue the value of the license. The
publishers through their own designated agents for the value of the musical
works that they own and that were created by songwriters.").
223. See supra text accompanying notes 166-67.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 168-69.
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frightening alternative to that scenario for the digital music
providers is to refuse to pay mechanical licenses for interactive
streams and risk the threat of an infringement lawsuit.
However, the real question is whether under the statutory
definition, a stream of any kind can be considered a DPD. In other
words, the question is whether a stream constitutes "a specifically
identifiable reproduction by or for any transmission recipient of a
phonorecord. 2
The answer to this question, at least in the
NMPA's view of on-demand streams, seems to turn on whether
those interactive streams displace record sales. 2 6 As an initial
matter, the proposed legislation equates non-interactive streaming,
i.e., webcasting, with terrestrial radio, by making it exempt from
the mechanical license. This recognizes that what is distributed in
webcasting is not a DPD, but a performance subject to
performance royalties only. While the NMPA is ready to concede
that point in the legislation, they believe there is an important
distinction when dealing with on-demand streams: the ability of a
consumer to request a performance of a song whenever the
consumer wants it. However, the consumer is still only receiving
the performance, not a "specifically identifiable reproduction."
Reproductions are made in the form of server copies and other
incidental copies, but they are not distributed. They are of no use
to the end user, except to the extent that those copies help facilitate
the distribution of the performance, for which the copyright owner
of the musical work already receives a royalty.
Furthermore, it is a questionable proposition to say that ondemand streams displace record sales, digital or physical, to any
recognizable extent. Even if they do, this should not be the
benchmark for determining whether a mechanical license is
needed. In the context of the digital world when a DPD is made
and delivered via a download, or in the physical world when a
phonorecord, in this example a CD, is sold to an end user, an
important benefit is received that is absent in an on-demand
stream: the ability to make a copy. Whether the copy is used for a
portable mp3 player, for a CD player in a car, or to give to a
friend, and regardless of the legality in making the copy, the ability
to make the copy is an important feature of owning a downloaded
225. See supra text accompanying note 40.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 117-18.
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song or a physical CD. A stream, even if it is on-demand, does not
offer that benefit, and because of that, it will not significantly
Even if on-demand streams do
displace phonorecord sales.
displace phonorecord sales to a limited extent, this still should not
be the benchmark for determining whether a mechanical license is
implicated, unless the legislature is going to change the definition
of a DPD, because like non-interactive transmissions, there is "no
reproduction of the sound recording or [] musical work embodied
therein [] made from the inception of the transmission through to
its receipt by the transmission recipient in order to make the sound
recording audible."2'27 Also, an argument concerned solely with
displacement of record sales fails to recognize that even though
one form of revenue may be decreasing, i.e., mechanical royalties,
another form of revenue is increasing, i.e., performance royalties.
In no case should digital music providers be required to pay twice
just because copies of a musical work, which have no value
without the delivery of the performance, are created in conjunction
with the performance, interactive or non-interactive.
On the other hand, if one reaches the conclusion that interactive
streams are not a DPD and therefore not covered by the Section
115 mechanical license, then the server copies made by digital
music providers, which are not distributed but merely facilitate
performance, would appear to be within the exclusive rights of the
copyright owner. It then follows that copyright owners of musical
works would be able to negotiate licenses for the server copies that
facilitate interactive streams. If as argued above, interactive
streams and non-interactive streams should be treated equally, it
follows that server copies that facilitate non-interactive radio-style
streaming should also require a negotiable license. What all this
boils down to is that while perhaps server copies have no value
independent of the performance, they may add value to the
performance. The proposed legislation's attempt to recognize this
for interactive streams while creating an exemption for noninteractive streams may make sense as a business negotiation, but
whether this solution should be recognized through statute is
another question. Ultimately, this was another reason the various
parties could not come to agreement.

227. 17 U.S.C. § 115(d) (2006).
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V. A SOLUTION REJECTED
Virtually every country that has had in place a mechanical
compulsory licensing system for musical works has rejected it in
favor of marketplace negotiations and collective administration,
licensing not only the reproduction and distribution rights, but the
public performance right as well. 28 Here, since 1909 when the
copyright owner's right to control mechanical reproductions of his
music works was created, the right has always been supplemented
by a compulsory license.229 The view of the Copyright Office is
that the Constitution speaks of securing authors' exclusive rights,
and compulsory licenses should only be implemented "in
exceptional cases, when the marketplace is incapable of
working."23 In harmony with that view, the Copyright Office
proposed a drastic change in 2005: The elimination of the statutory
mechanical license.23' The general idea of the proposal was to use
the collective licensing model used for performance rights, which
all parties agree works well, and extend that system to
reproduction and distribution rights.232
This appeared to be a solution free from government
intervention. The marketplace could determine the exact worth of
a musical work without the need to quibble over whether a
performance right or a distribution right was implicated. The
organization administering the license would have the authority to
license both rights, thereby eliminating the bifurcated system
where one organization fights to get paid for the distribution right,
while another fights to get paid for the performance right. Authors
would no longer be bound to a license rate set by the government!
Surely, this would be a solution everyone could agree upon, right?
Wrong. DiMA, the NMPA, the SGA, and the RIAA all came out

228. Copyright Office Views on Music Licensing Reform: HearingBefore the
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the Comm. on
the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 16 (2005) [hereinafter Copyright Office Views]

(statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, U.S. Copyright Office).
229. Id. at 19.
230. Id. at 18 (referring to U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8).
231. See id. at 56-68.
232. Id. at 20 (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, U.S.
Copyright Office).
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against the Copyright Office's proposal.2 33 Among the chief
concerns mentioned was that the proposal did not guarantee parity
with performance rights licensing. Every party was unwilling to
replace a system they all believed unworkable with a system of
which the operation they all believed was uncertain. Furthermore,
exactly which groups would benefit from the proposal was a
concern as well. Certainly, a solution that allows an organization
to license the reproduction, distribution, and performance rights
would mean someone would lose. Competition would erupt
between ASCAP, BMI, SESAC, and the HFA, as well as any new
comers attempting to take advantage of the free market, and the
market shares of these entities would shift as each tried to become
the dominant collective administrator. Meanwhile, DiMA and the
RIAA were worried that new administrative burdens would arise,
making it more difficult to license rights than under the current
Section 115. These organizations recognize that one of the aspects
making performance rights licensing so easy is the fact that only a
few licensors exist. DiMA and the RIAA fear that a free market
would bring a multiplication of collective administrators, creating
the need for licensees to go to a variety of licensors, making the
new system just as cumbersome, if not more so, than the current
system.234
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States Constitution granted Congress the authority
"To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
'
their respective Writings and Discoveries." 235
This authority "to
grant to individual authors the limited monopoly of copyright is
predicated upon the dual premises that the public benefits from the
creative activities of authors, and that the copyright monopoly is a
necessary condition to the full realization of such creative
'
activities."236
This recognizes a balance between an author's
233.
234.
RIAA).
235.
236.

See id. at 18.
See Copyright Office Views, supra note 228 at 59-60 (letter from
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
1 NIMMER, supra note 12, § 1.03[A].

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol17/iss1/3

40

Sanchez: The Section 115 Mechanical License and the Copyright Modernizatio

2006] LEGISLATING MUSIC INDUSTRY NEGOTIATIONS

77

ability to create and make a living from his works on the one hand,
and the public's right to access to those works on the other hand.
Since the inception of the 1909 Copyright Act, with respect to
mechanical licenses of nondramatic musical works, Congress has
attempted to strike a proper balance between these competing
interests. The ultimate question that rises from SIRA is whether
the proper balance has been struck.
From the bitter fights that erupted over this legislation, that
answer is a resounding no. The biggest problem is that SIRA has
not protected those who deserve the protection: the authors. It is
the authors upon which the entire music business depends.
Without them there would be no songs to record, nor any songs to
distribute digitally or otherwise. Yet, the authors have been forced
to accept a small statutory fee of currently 9.1 cents for their
musical works, (which would be forty cents had the fee risen with
the consumer pricing index) while record companies are allowed
to freely negotiate for the price of the recordings embodying the
musical works.
An underlying theme can be drawn from the fights over SIRA,
the Copyright Office's proposal, and every hearing that has
considered Section 115 reform: Each party interested in Section
115 wants reform, but they want reform on terms that benefit their
organization, usually at the expense of every other party interested.
The mere fact that SIRA represents eighty-six pages of the
Copyright Modernization Act, a one hundred page bill, is evidence
of just how difficult it is to reach agreement on the issue. It is also
indicative of the need, as the Copyright Office suggested, to
eliminate Section 115 from the Copyright Act. DiMA, the NMPA,
the SGA, and the RIAA have not tried to create a piece of
legislation. They have tried to hammer out a business contract,
which they should be allowed to do, but without the intervention
of government.
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